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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEAL
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

No. 03-3319

ESTATE OF DAVID GLEIBERMAN;
CLOTIDES GLEIBERM AN, on behalf of
themselves and all others similarly situated
v.
THE HARTFORD LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY
Estate of David Gleiberman; Clotildes Gleiberman,
Appellants

On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of New Jersey
(D.C. Civil No. 03-cv-00309)
District Judge: Hon. Garrett E. Brown, Jr.

Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
April 12, 2004
BEFORE: RENDELL, COW EN and LAY*, Circuit Judges
(Filed: April 19, 2004)

OPINION

*Honorable Donald P. Lay, Senior United States Circuit Judge for the Eighth Circuit,
sitting by designation.

COWEN, Circuit Judge.
The Estate of David Gleiberman and Clotides Gleiberman (collectively “the
Gleibermans”) appeal the order of the District Court dismissing their claims against the
Hartford Life Insurance Company (“Hartford”). The Gleibermans contend that the
District Court erred in ruling on the motion to dismiss before deciding the issue of class
certification, erred in finding that Hartford’s notification procedure was not inadequate as
a matter of law, and incorrectly applied the standard for a motion to dismiss. We will
affirm.
Background
On April 19, 1993, Mr. Gleiberman signed an “Application for Variable Annuity
Contract” (“the application”) with Hartford. On May 18, 1993, Mr. Gleiberman made a
payment of $617,281.90 to Hartford and was given a copy of the application he had
previously filled out and signed, as well as a copy of Hartford’s “Individual Flexible
Premium Variable Annuity Contract” (“the contract”). The contract stated that Mr.
Gleiberman had the right to cancel within ten days, by returning the contract to Hartford
along with a written request for cancellation. It informed Mr. Gleiberman that the
Annuity Commencement Date was July 4, 2002. The contract explained that “[t]his date
may be changed by the Contract Owner with 30 days advance written notification, and
may be the fifteenth of any month before or including the month of the Annuitant’s 90th
birthday.” (App. vol. 2 at 37.) The contract further provided Mr. Gleiberman with four
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alternatives for the annuity payment and explained, “[i]n the absence of an election by the
Contract Owner the Termination Value without deduction for any contingent deferred
sales charge will be applied on the Annuity Commencement Date under the second option
to provide a life annuity with 120 payments certain.” 1 (Id. at 39.) Finally, the contract
stated that Mr. Gleiberman was the annuitant, and that his wife, Clotides Gleiberman was
the designated beneficiary.
On April 30, 2002, Hartford sent Mr. Gleiberman a courtesy reminder, notifying
him that it was time to select one of the payment options, and that if no option was
selected, the annuity would be paid out as a life annuity with 120 months certain.
Hartford received no response to the notice. On August 6, 2002, Hartford sent Mr.
Gleiberman a notice indicating that the life annuity with 60 payments certain had been
selected, along with a check for the first annuity payment.
Mr. Gleiberman’s son, Paul Gleiberman, wrote to Hartford in on August 14, 2002,
requesting copies of the contract and copies of any correspondence from Mr. Gleiberman
confirming the election of the life annuity option. Hartford responded, indicating that the
contract had stipulated that the life annuity option would be selected if Mr. Gleiberman
failed to select one of the other options before the annuity commencement date of July 4,
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Although the contract indicated that the life annuity option with 120 months certain
would be selected, it also stated that IRS rules governed the contract. Those rules
required that the period-certain portion of an annuity contract not exceed the life
expectancy of the annuitant. Mr. Gleiberman’s life expectancy was 5 years at the time the
annuity began.
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2002. On October 3, 2002, Paul Gleiberman again wrote to Hartford, explaining that Mr.
Gleiberman had never received the reminder notice, that Mr. Gleiberman was rejecting
the forced annuitization of the contract because it was done without his consent, and that
Mr. Gleiberman would not be depositing any of the annuity checks. Hartford replied that
the forced annuitization had occurred pursuant to the clear language of the contract, but
that Hartford was willing to (1) reinstate the original contract and defer the annuity for an
additional five years, or (2) allow Mr. Gleiberman to select one of the other options. The
letter included a quote for payments under the fourth option, in response to a request by
Paul Gleiberman.
The Gleibermans later filed this putative class action suit, alleging common law
claims for unjust enrichment, breach of the implied duty of good faith and fair dealing,
restitution, and breach of fiduciary duty. In addition, the Gleibermans filed a claim under
N.J. Stat. Ann. § 17:29C-1.1 to 1.2. On July 17, 2003, the District Court dismissed the
complaint, finding that the Gleibermans had failed to state a claim upon which relief
could be granted.
Discussion
We exercise plenary review over a district court’s decision to grant a motion to
dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6). Doug Grant, Inc. v. Greate Bay Casino Corp., 232 F.3d 173,
183 (3d Cir. 2000). A motion to dismiss may be granted only when, “accepting all
well-pleaded allegations in the complaint as true, and viewing them in the light most
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favorable to plaintiff, plaintiff is not entitled to relief.” Maio v. Aetna, Inc., 221 F.3d
472, 481-82 (3d Cir. 2000) (citations omitted). In reviewing the motion to dismiss, we
may also consider exhibits attached to and incorporated into the complaint. See ALA,
Inc. v. CCAIR, Inc., 29 F.3d 855, 859 (3d Cir. 1994). In this case, such documents
include the application, the contract, the reminder notice, and the correspondence between
Paul Gleiberman and Hartford.
The Gleibermans argue that the District Court deviated from the proper standard in
deciding the motion to dismiss. They argue that, because the complaint provided fair
notice of the claims being asserted against Hartford, the District Court should have denied
the motion to dismiss and permitted discovery to go forward. They do not point to a
specific error, however, and we find none.
Even accepting everything stated in the complaint and incorporated documents as
true the Gleibermans have failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. The
contract disclosed to Mr. Gleiberman that the Annuity Commencement Date would be
July 4, 2002, but that Mr. Gleiberman could change that date if he desired. It also
informed him of the four payout options and, if he had not yet selected one of the four
methods of payment listed in the contract by the Annuity Commencement Date, the
second option would be the default selection. The contract disclosed that it was governed
by IRS rules, which limited the guaranteed period of any annuity to the life expectancy of
the Annuitant at the time of the Annuity Commencement Date. Finally, the contract
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informed Mr. Gleiberman of his right to cancel the contract within ten days. All of these
provisions were laid out in clear, unambiguous language.
As of July 4, 2004, Mr. Gleiberman had not changed the Annuity Commencement
date or selected a payout option. Hartford began making payments under the second
option, as was spelled out in the contract. The District Court assumed, as it was required,
that all of these facts were true. Nevertheless, it found that the Gleibermans had failed to
state a claim.
The Gleibermans have asserted that the contract was a contract of adhesion.
As the District Court found, however, there is nothing inherently inequitable or unfair in
the contract. Mr. Gleiberman had an opportunity to cancel the contract if he did not like
the terms; he did not do so, indicating an intent to be bound by the contract. In addition,
the Gleibermans argue that the contract was unfair because the default selection provision
was not adequately disclosed, and that Hartford’s practice of sending a courtesy reminder
notice regarding the selection provisions was unreasonable and inadequate. The default
provisions are clearly stated on page 14 of the contract, however. Insurance purchasers
are obligated to read their policies, and are bound by the clear terms in those policies.
Edwards v. Prudential Prop. & Cas. Co., 357 N.J. Super. 196, 204-05 (App. Div. 2003)
certif. denied, 176 N.J. 278 (2003). Insurance providers are under no obligation to point
out provisions or to explain clear and unambiguous provisions within the policy. Id. In
addition, the contract does not require that Hartford send any reminder notice regarding
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the Annuity Date. As there is nothing inherently unfair or inequitable in the contract, it is
valid and enforceable.
The Gleibermans argue that Hartford is legally required to provide a reminder
notice of some kind, but cite no authority for this proposition. In the alternative, they
argue that Hartford should follow the notice provisions of N.J. Stat. Ann. § 17:29C-1.2.
This provision provides that “[e]very insurer shall permit its senior citizen insureds to
designate a third party to whom the insurer shall transmit a copy of notices of
cancellation, nonrenewal and conditional renewal.” N.J. Stat. Ann. § 17.29C-1.2. The
section defines senior citizen as an individual who is at least 62 years old. N.J. Stat. Ann.
§ 17.29C-1.1. The section further spells out that the notice must be sent via certified mail
with a return receipt requested, and that the envelope must be clearly marked “Important
Insurance Policy Information: Open Immediately.” N.J. Stat. Ann. § 17.29C-1.2.
As the Gleibermans concede, this statute does not provide a private right of action.
As such, the District Court correctly dismissed the statutory claim. Further, the statute is
inapplicable to this case. The reminder notice was not a notice of cancellation,
nonrenewal, or conditional renewal; it was a reminder that the Annuity Commencement
Date was approaching. At all times, Hartford acting in accordance with the clear terms of
the contract. Hartford was not required to follow the provisions of § 17.29C-1.2, and the
Gleibermans point to no other authority that either requires Hartford to send a reminder
notice at all, or to send such notice in a specific manner.
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As the contract is valid and enforceable, the District Court correctly dismissed the
claims for unjust enrichment and restitution. Claims for unjust enrichment and the
corresponding remedy, restitution, are only supportable when the parties’ rights are not
governed by a valid, enforceable contract. Suburban Transfer Service, Inc. v. Beech
Holdings, Inc., 716 F.2d 220, 226-27 (3d Cir. 1983). Likewise, the District Court
properly dismissed the claim for breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, as
Hartford acted in accordance with the terms of the contract at all times. See Rudbart v.
North Jersey Dist. Water Supply Comm’n, 127 N.J. 344, 365-66 ( 1992) (the principle of
fair dealing will not alter the written terms of a contract). Finally, the contract clearly
stated the Annuity Commencement Date, the payout options, the default payout option,
and the fact that all of the options were governed by IRS law, which required that any
payment certain period of the annuity be limited to the annuitant’s life expectancy at the
beginning of the annuity period. Hartford was under no obligation to point out these
provisions, and at all times, Hartford acted under the clear terms of the contract. Even
assuming that Hartford owed Mr. Gleiberman a fiduciary duty, Hartford did not breach
that duty.
Finally, the Gleibermans argue that the District Court erred in granting Hartford’s
motion to dismiss before deciding the issue of class certification. We review decisions
regarding class certification for abuse of discretion. Zimmerman v. HBO Affiliate Group,
834 F.2d 1163, 1169-70 (3d Cir. 1987). The District Court did not abuse its discretion in
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determining that the named plaintiffs had failed to state a claim upon which relief could
be granted prior to deciding the issue of class certification. See Searles v. Southeastern
Pa. Transp. Auth., 990 F.2d 789, 790 n.1 & 794 (3d Cir. 1993) (affirming grant of motion
to dismiss for failure to state a claim and noting that “[t]he district court did not rule on
the class certification because it ultimately concluded that plaintiff failed to state a
claim.”); Zimmerman, 834 F.2d at 1169-70 (finding no error in district court’s refusal to
consider class certification before determining whether the named plaintiff had a cause of
action).
Conclusion
For the reasons discussed above, the judgment of the District Court will be
affirmed.
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